I. INTRODUCTION
"Repugnancy clauses"-those constitutional provisions that, in language that varies from nation to nation, require legislation to conform to some core conception of Islam-are all the rage these days. 1 This clause, a relatively recent addition to many modern constitutions, has emerged as a central focus of academic writing on Muslim state constitutions generally, and on Arab constitutions in particular. 2 Much of the attention it has received has been enlightening and erudite. 3 Yet one aspect of the broader repugnancy discourse that deserves some attention is an important, often de facto, temporal limitation on the effect of the clause. There appears to be a rising trend that repugnancy in the Arab world should not apply to legislation enacted prior to the date that the repugnancy clause was [48:427 inserted into the Constitution. Irrespective of electoral results throughout the region heavily favoring parties that seek a more robust role for shari'a in public life, parties I will describe for the purposes of this Article as "Islamist," this trend seem to be growing deeper roots.
The trend is particularly ironic because the canon is fundamentally incoherent, both from the perspective of constitutional structure as well as substantive policy. As to the former, surely a constitutional amendment of this sort must generally have retroactive effect. It would make little sense to amend a constitution to grant all citizens equal protection under the law and then for a court to suggest that existing slavery laws might be exempted because enacted before the amendment in question. Such a result would be one that courts would generally resist to the extent it was possible to do so, given how much violence is done to the amendment by the limitations. This would seem to be no less the case for a clause requiring legislative conformity with Islam.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, if there exists in any state a broad view that law should conform to Islam (a commonly stated Islamist position), 4 and if that view is widespread (a fair conclusion given recent electoral results), then surely the advocates of that view should be as willing to apply it to past legislation as to future. Either the Islamicity of legislation is a cornerstone of the Muslim state or it is not. If it is, then the date of the legislation vis-à-vis the date of the repugnancy amendment is surely beside the point for the advocates of shari'a conformity. Indeed, the fact of the incoherence may well explain the reluctance to discuss it often, particularly openly.
Ironically, however, despite the incoherence, the limitations on repugnancy have spread. Given this, this Article addresses how and why these limitations grew so popular, and what it might portend for the future of Islamist parties in the Arab world. Part II discusses in detail the origins of the trend in the Arab world, 5 including the well- 5. Importantly, the notion of repugnancy existed in Pakistan as early as 1973, and known Decision 20 of 1985 issued by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (SCC), which exempted existing legislation from Egypt's repugnancy clause in a decision that specifically upheld a provision of the Civil Code permitting the taking of money interest on a loan. 6 This Part shows that, in issuing its decision, the SCC was constrained in what actions it could take. It could not retain legitimacy as an arbiter of Islam, at least among Islamist groups, if it deemed money interest to be permissible under the shari'a. At the same time, it could not very well strike down all legislation permitting money interest without engendering some sort of nearly complete economic catastrophe. Hence, drawing on legislative history to justify its result, the SCC embarked upon the path of incoherence.
Part III will demonstrate that far from having been repudiated, the primary Egyptian Islamist political party, the Muslim Brotherhood, has embraced not only the repugnancy clause in Egypt's constitution, but also the SCC's jurisprudence. Its earlier attempts to ensure greater Islamicity in law, which engendered much resistance in Egypt, did not object to the exclusively prospective effect of Egypt's repugnancy clause. The Part will further demonstrate that Iraq's Islamist constitutional drafters were not only aware of this Egyptian example, but sought to replicate it much more forthrightly in the Iraqi constitution. Finally, this Part will discuss the strong statements issued by Tunisia's Islamist party, the victorious Ennahda, that it will not seek to dismantle the state's existing legal framework.
Part IV will conclude with a series of explanations as to how this came about. It will first show that the very same concerns that animated the SCC in Egypt over 25 years ago would undoubtedly remain a central issue for any Islamist party focused on economic development, as every Islamist party claims to be. Secondly, it will Id. at 783 n.86. Nevertheless, because of language differences, cultural differences, and the fact that Pakistan is a common law society while the Arab world generally operates under civil law, Pakistani influence on Arab law is quite marginal. As such, I do not include discussion of Pakistani example in the Article, other than to point out the perhaps obvious point that interpretive approaches to repugnancy different from those used in the Arab world may well prevail in other, important Muslim state jurisdictions. [48:427
demonstrate that Islamists seek to use repugnancy to address their fears of further state secularization rather than to Islamize society. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Part will show that Islamist parties genuinely seek a greater public role for shari'a, but prefer to see its realization through the use of mechanisms other than the state, and using means other than state compulsion. While the Article focuses on three particular (and particularly influential) Arab states, the lessons to be drawn might reverberate more broadly throughout much of the Arab world.
II. THE COLLISION OF REPUGNANCIES AND ECONOMIC REALITIES
In 1980, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution was amended so that shari'a became the principal source of legislation rather than a principal source of legislation, as it had been prior to the amendment.
7
On its surface, the enhanced role of judicial review as a result of this rather small change is not apparent. The amendment seems to require that the sole principal source material for any law would be shari'a, though presumably other material could be used as well, so long as its use was not so broad as to be deemed "principal." Logistically, it is difficult to imagine a court examining a complex piece of legislation, trying to find a source for each and every provision in it, and then making a determination as to whether or not the legislation as a whole "principally" derives from shari'a or any other source. Moreover, not only is such an approach logistically difficult, it also would almost surely result in the invalidation of large amounts of vitally important legislation.
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The fact is that in drafting most modern law, from securities laws 9 to bankruptcy laws, 10 the vast compendia of norms 7. Stilt, supra note 4, at 80. That the Drafting Committee's Preparatory Report seemed to grant some deference to the legislature to determine precisely what the "principles" of the shari'a were only adds to the conclusion that the amendment was not primarily focused on the possibility of judicial review.
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On another level, however, at least in theory, the amendment might retain some force as constitutional constraint on legislation. Whatever "the principal source of legislation" might mean in terms of the influence that the shari'a might have on legislation (exceedingly slight as concerns the securities laws, and quite significant as concerns family law), 14 surely it must mean that the legislation in These rules, as developed by individual jurists, are not always consistent with one another. 16 Thus, some thought would have to be
given as to what "repugnancy" to shari'a might mean. Still, at least in theory, to the extent that a "core" of the shari'a could be found, by letter or by spirit, the legislation could not be in stark violation of it.
17
At the very least, for example, repugnancy would prevent the enactment of a law that provided for the enforcement of contracts that related to conduct that jurists and scholars operating within the Islamic legal tradition had deemed to be deeply sinful (for example, contracts for the sale of alcohol). Similarly, repugnancy would seem to render unconstitutional a law that forbade conduct that was almost unanimously deemed to be religiously mandated (for example, a prohibition against maintaining the fast in Ramadan). 18 If nothing else, surely laws of this sort could hardly be considered to be consistent with a requirement that shari'a be the principal source of legislation. There would thus be, in the end, some role for judicial review in a revised Article 2, even if only at the margins.
All of this was largely speculation until May of 1985, when the refer to nothing beyond a perfect and immutable Divine Law separate and apart from any human effort to understand that law, then almost as a matter of epistemological necessity it means precisely nothing that can be known and is of no value to lawyers. This is to say nothing of the manner in which shari'a is used in the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, the context here, where it absolutely includes references to some legal content. See, e.g., LOMBARDI, supra note 13, at 180 (quoting Case no. 7/1993/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt)). Hence I find my definition, while contestable, more appropriate under the circumstances.
16. Hamoudi, supra note 15, at 435. 17. I have been deeply critical of efforts to find a letter or spirit in shari'a given the vast and conflicting corpus of rules that comprise it. Id. at 437-38. Accordingly, I have always found repugnancy to be inconsistently applied in fact and hardly a matter to be taken particularly seriously as genuine Islamic constraint on legislative activity. Hamoudi, supra note 1, at 328-33 (describing inconsistencies and failures of repugnancy); Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 710-11 (suggesting that repugnancy review in Iraq is largely "ornamental", a function of identity politics rather than a genuine commitment to ensure that law conforms to shari'a). It is important to note that these considerations are beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses exclusively on one important aspect of repugnancy as it is developing in the Arab tradition, and that is to immunize existing legislation from any form of judicial review on the basis of repugnancy.
18. See Stilt, supra note 4, at 96 (offering the examples of intoxicants and the fast at Ramadan as examples of unchanging and universally accepted rules).
Supreme Constitutional Court issued its famed Decision 20. As it happened, the medical school at the most venerable seat of Sunni Islamic learning, the Al-Azhar University, bought surgical instruments from the late Fouad Goudah for the price of approximately 592 Egyptian Guineas (or $100) and failed to pay him back. 19 He received judgment for this amount, and in addition, 4% interest on the debt from the date he was forced to pursue legal action for the Azhar's delinquence, as permitted under Article 226 of the Egyptian Civil Code. 20 The Azhar's response was to pursue a claim before the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, claiming that the Civil Code's permitting of interest was a clear violation of the shari'a, and as such, provisions of the Civil Code which permitted interest did not use shari'a as their principal source of legislation. 21 The difficulty in which the SCC found itself had very little to do with shari'a doctrine in fact. While there is an unmistakable condemnation in very strident terms of a practice known as riba in Islam's core revelatory texts, there was ample resource to determine that riba did not encompass money interest on a loan. For example, the SCC could have maintained that under the prevailing Sunni school of thought which historically prevailed in Egypt, the Hanafi, the prohibition as against the trading of items for delay and with gain (a common form of riba as per foundational text) did not apply to money, but only items measurable by weight or volume. 22 Hence it was forbidden to trade 10 pounds of gold for 15 pounds in the future, but a trade of $10 for $15 in the future (i.e. money interest) was not intended to be covered. 23 The SCC could have instead cited authority from a second school that permitted trades of copper coins for more coins in the future because that school, the Maliki, excluded from the forbidden trades metals that were not precious. 24 Or the SCC could have attempted a more modernist approach in the fashion developed 19 . SCC Decision, supra note 6, at 102. 20. Id. 21. Id. 22 . Hamoudi, supra note 15, at 448.
23
. Shi'i jurists use this distinction to permit the trading of currencies with gain, so long as it is a different currency. Thus, a trade of $10 for $15 to be paid later is prohibited, but a trade of $10 for £15 to be paid later is acceptable. 2 ALI SISTANI, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN §234.
24. The Maliki jurist Ibn Rushd, commonly known as Averroes, criticizes his own school's position on this basis. See 3 IBN RUSHD, BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID 1568-71 ("and thus we see that the legal cause is narrow . . . because it does not extend beyond gold and silver").
[48:427
by the drafter of the Egyptian Civil Code, Abdul Razzaq al Sanhuri, who does justify Article 226 as being consistent with shari'a.
25 Any of these approaches was, from a purely doctrinal standpoint, plausible.
The problem was that none of them were, in the context of the times, deemed particularly legitimate, particularly in Islamist eyes.
By 1985, despite earlier modernist efforts to the contrary, a broad Islamist position had developed which held that there was "complete unanimity among all schools of thought in Islam that the term riba stands for interest in all its types and forms." 26 Efforts to justify the taking of money interest were in turn characterized as being "apologetic about Islam" 27 or "defeatist." 28 Thus, any decision to legitimize the taking of interest as consistent with Islam would have led to a considerable loss of legitimacy on the part of the SCC among Islamist groups, and the SCC might well have been dismissed by such groups as being little more than an instrument of the executive rather than a truly separate and independent branch of government. At the same time, it hardly needs to be said that money interest is a vital part of virtually any modern, successful economy and to declare it unlawful would have catastrophic economic consequences. The SCC thus found itself squarely between the Scylla of a disastrous loss of legitimacy and the Charybdis of economic ruin.
The SCC rescued itself from this dilemma through creative and clever incoherence. It accepted the principle that money interest was a form of riba, and that as such, it was stridently condemned in Islam, making any law deeming it permissible plainly repugnant to shari'a.
29
Yet at the same time, relying on legislative history to reach its bizarre conclusion, the SCC also indicated that the judiciary only retained the power to strike down legislation enacted after the 1980 amendment, 29. SCC Decision, supra note 6, at 102 (indicating that the Qur'anic practice of riba was equivalent to interest and therefore "unanimously condemned by divine rule").
to the extent that such legislation violated shari'a. 30 To quote the SCC more fully:
[T]he obligation imposed on the [legislature] to follow the principles of the shari'a and to consider them as the source of legislation is aimed only at the legislative enactments which are issued after the date of the imposition of the said obligation, and does not cover former legislative enactments. . . . [O] nly such new legislative enactments fall within the prohibition to the effect that they should not be contrary to the principles of Islamic law.
[I]t follows the above that only the legal enactments issued after the coming into effect of the obligation to conform to Islamic law are affected, so that, should any such legal enactments be in conflict with the principles of Islamic law, such legal enactments alone would fall in the domain of constitutional illegality. . . . [L]egal enactments which antedated the amendment are not affected by the obligation to conform because they were in existence before that limitation became due for implementation.
[C]onsequently, such prior enactments are immune from the application of the limitation because of its anterior date, which is the determining factor on which proper constitutional control is based.
31
There is little reason to explore at length the faulty logic and strained reasoning of the SCC. The more important point was that it succeeded. Through this combination of creative incoherence and political necessity, a conception of repugnancy was born in Egypt from an amendment that on its face does not deal directly with voiding law in conflict with shari'a. While an interesting story on its own, even more remarkable is the continued appeal of this type of approach to repugnancy. This is the subject of the next two sections.
III. ISLAMISTS AND REPUGNANCY

A. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Egypt's premier Islamist party, the Muslim Brotherhood has supported the SCC's approach to repugnancy, thereby demonstrating the SCC's success in developing legitimacy for its approach. [48:427 and had suffered through decades of political repression for it. 32 The amendment of Article 2 was in many ways designed to mollify the Brotherhood. 33 Yet rather than argue that the SCC had, in Decision 20 of 1985, unjustifiably stripped the courts of their necessary powers of review with respect to the Islamicity of legislation, the Brotherhood seems to have embraced not only Article 2 as amended, but also the SCC's jurisprudence with respect to the Article. 34 Indeed, the Brotherhood uses the SCC to demonstrate that its own views on how to recognize Islam in the state fit well within Egypt's constitutional structure as it already existed. 35 In its own draft political platform issued in 2007, the Brotherhood described Article 2 as being precisely the type of "moderate" Islam it advocated, rejecting theocratic rule and explicitly endorsing the Article "according to what the SCC has determined in interpreting the Article." 36 The Brotherhood similarly prepared an electoral program in November of 2010 in anticipation of the People's Assembly elections held that year. That program described a number of constitutional articles requiring amendment, but Article 2 was not one, even though it would have been easy to demand a change that would subject existing legislation to judicial review on the grounds of Islamicity. 37 32. Stilt, supra note 4, at 76-78. As Stilt correctly indicates, the level of repression to which the Muslim Brotherhood was subjected did wax and wane over Egypt's history, but the group was never fully tolerated. That the Brotherhood does not seem to seek a broader mandate for the SCC so as to extend to existing legislation also seems demonstrated from those proposals it does publicize that generate controversy. Hence, for example, the Brotherhood's draft political platform in 2007 argued for the creation of a council composed of religious scholars. 38 These scholars would advise the legislature, and significantly, the legislature would be free to ignore the council's directives as to any matters that did not impinge upon a ruling within Islam that was absolutely certain. 39 The clear implication is that as to such certain rulings, among them the taking of interest according to the SCC as earlier described, the legislature would be bound by the council's decision. 40 Significantly, however, this evidently would only encompass efforts to enact future legislation, rather than to void older legislation, as the council advises the legislature and the executive, with no mention made of the judiciary.
41
The council would thus act in precisely the same manner as the SCC has interpreted its own jurisdictional mandate as concerns Article 2-to address future legislation, that is, albeit at the law's inception rather than when subsequently challenged.
This seems to reflect a significant dissatisfaction with legislative and executive activities as they relate to Islam and the state, but comparatively less as concerns the SCC and its jurisprudence. Indeed, the SCC is never criticized in the Draft Platform at all. 42 Article Two merely reaffirmed a pre-existing legal order. Id. at 97-98. I did not so understand these rather abstruse ruminations in the Draft Political Platform. I understood the Brotherhood merely to be advancing a sort of natural law theory that the validity of the shari'a as a form of law supersedes any positive law enacted by the state, including the Constitution. That is to say, the shari'a does not need Article 2 for its validation, as this would suggest that God's Law was somehow not binding upon the state unless affirmed by the foundational law of the state. That would not to my mind necessarily empower the state's judiciary to invalidate existing legislation in conflict with Article 2. It might only obligate the legislature rather than the draft document that went so far as to propose a council of religious scholars who could advise and even bind the legislature. 44 If this was the position of the party in 2007, it is even more so now. The party platform of the Freedom and Justice Party, the surrogate of the Brotherhood for the purposes of the 2011 People's Assembly elections, 45 is devoid of any mention of a council of scholars and lacks a great deal of specifics on the role of shari'a in public affairs. 46 Admittedly, and importantly, the Brotherhood has never openly endorsed the specific SCC principle that existing legislation is immune from review for compatibility with Islam. To do so might risk the loss of some support among a more ardent conservative base of support who would demand that some effort be made to Islamize existing laws. Yet at the same time, the Brotherhood has not challenged the SCC's determinations or suggested an alternative path, at least not in any clear fashion, even as it has endorsed the SCC's work generally. This is quite telling of its inclinations.
B. Iraq
It is one thing for an unusual set of circumstances in Egypt to have led to a broadly acceptable result on the meaning and scope of repugnancy. It is quite another to find that same conception of repugnancy transplanted to other Arab states. One brief look at the Iraq constitution demonstrates that the ideas that have permeated Egypt have now transplanted themselves into Iraq. Specifically, the Iraqi constitutional text appears to reflect the SCC's jurisprudence to a large extent.
First, the Iraqi Constitution embraces the idea of repugnancy unambiguously. Hence, it indicates that "it is not permissible to enact any law that contradicts the settled rulings of Islam." 47 In Egypt, as judiciary to revise existing legislation to bring it in conformity with shari'a over time, a point the SCC itself makes in Decision 20. SCC Decision, supra note 6, at 106.
44. Stilt points to two areas where the Brotherhood seems to seek expansion of Article 2 review. These are the effort to permit any individual with an interest to pursue a claim before the SCC for an Article 2 violation, and an effort to subject not merely laws, but also executive orders and regulations, to review for compliance with shari'a. Stilt This is not mere happenstance. In my own conversations with them, the Iraqi constitutional drafters were aware during their negotiations that Egypt had been operating under a principle of repugnancy for nearly two decades. 48 They were also aware that repugnancy provisions had appeared in the constitution of Afghanistan, 49 and as a result, Islamists within Iraq of both the Shi'i and Sunni variety wanted to ensure that a similar provision appeared in the Iraqi constitution. Secular and nationalist forces resisted this because they wanted to minimize the role of Islam and shari'a in the nation state to the extent possible. 50 Various factions proposed different formulations, and this opened several lines of debate that are well beyond the purposes of this Article to explore in detail. [48:427 the "enactment" of laws that violate Islam's "settled rulings." It does not invalidate legislation already in existence. Indeed, Article 130 indicates that existing legislation remains in force until repealed or amended. 52 This appears to be an effective endorsement of the SCC's approach-validating prior legislation, and subjecting future legislation to review for Islamicity. At least one important Iraqi legal expert has taken this position.
53
Iraqi Islamists generally deny such a reading is possible. They point first to the incoherence of the result, though that did not appear to be a problem for the SCC in Egypt, operating on far shakier textual ground than is available in Iraq. A leading drafter of Iraq's original constitution indicates that Article 13, Section 2 forecloses such an argument, because it indicates that any law that conflicts with the constitution is void. 54 This argument might work as for existing legislation that conflicts with a separate article of the Constitution notwithstanding the indication in Article 130 that existing legislation is deemed valid. 55 Hence, an existing law that denied gender equality would be deemed void under Article 13, Section 2 as in conflict with the principle that all Iraqis are equal before the law irrespective of gender as set forth in Article 14, even if Article 130 validated existing legislation more generally. Yet an existing law that violates Islam's "settled rulings" does not on its own conflict with the Constitution, given that the Constitution only prohibits future enactment of such laws. At the very least, there is ambiguity and confusion as to the status of existing legislation.
Nevertheless, when faced with the opportunity to amend Article 2 to make absolutely clear that existing law in conflict with shari'a would be deemed void (perhaps using language very similar to that contained in Article 13, Section 2), the Shi'a Islamists demurred. They did not quite endorse the possibility of a more limited approach, but rather repeated the implausibility of the interpretation, expressed their confidence that the courts in Iraq would not replicate those of Egypt, and indicated concern over the controversy that would surround any attempt to strengthen Article 2 because of secular opposition. These arguments hardly seem convincing, and are internally inconsistent. After all, to the extent it is obvious that existing legislation is not immunized, an amended and clarified Article 2 should do little to raise secular objection. Moreover, secular objection did not prevent Islamist groups from including successfully in a final amendment proposal a revision to very controversial provisions regarding the Islamizing of family and inheritance laws.
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It seemed plain that the Islamist forces were content to leave the text in a manner that appeared to endorse the SCC's scheme in Egypt, yet they could not bring themselves to say as much. Far from being dismissed as a poorly reasoned anomaly, the SCC's approach appears to have crossed borders. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court seems to endorse this result of immunizing state legislation, albeit not necessarily by applying the same explicit temporal limitation that the SCC adopted in Egypt. The Court went on to make clear that until such a law was enacted, determining the areas on which the various juristic rulings agreed and reconciling as between inconsistent rulings, the offending [48:427 provision would stand as it was. The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to a provision in Iraq's Personal Status Code that denied a party the right to issue a divorce through an agent.
58
In both of these cases, the Federal Supreme Court did not foreclose the possibility that the challenged provisions were indeed repugnant to Islam. It did, however, immunize the provisions from judicial review for Islamicity. The Court did this, it stated, because the provisions were part of existing, complex legislation which only the legislature could sensibly amend to conform to Islam. The reasoning is not identical to that of the SCC, and makes no explicit mention of the temporal limitations that Article 2 of the Constitution imply. Yet it reaches precisely the same result and has precisely the same effect-existing provisions of Iraqi law escaped repugnancy review and were left for the legislature to amend, if it saw fit.
C. Tunisia
The final state in the Arab world worth discussing, because of the massive change it has undergone in the past few years, is Tunisia.
59
Over the past several decades, Tunisia has operated as a highly secularized dictatorship, with a 1974 constitutional amendment that declared the late President Habib Borguiba "President for Life." 60 Its constitutional process remains in its infancy, 61 and Tunisia's primary Islamist party, Ennahda, is vague as to its own ambitions concerning the role of Islam. 62 As a result, very little can be said as to 58 . Decision 59 of 2011, Iraq Federal Supreme Court. 59. Only one other Arab state, Libya, has undergone a total regime transformation recently. Unfortunately, it is hardly useful to discuss Arab constitutionalism with respect to it. The state's institutions have been so weak and ineffective as a historical matter that state building has to date proven daunting, and the government seems to exert little control, with TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A1 (describing Ennahda and its candidates as focusing on economic issues and security rather than moral concerns). Even the website of Ennahda reflects the vagueness of its own constitutional vision. Nothing comparable to the Brotherhood's electoral program, much less the Brotherhood draft Platform, can be found on it. See generally whether or not existing law will be subjected to some sort of repugnancy test in Tunisia at all. 63 Yet from all indications, and to the extent repugnancy is even relevant, Tunisia appears very much to be sharing this rising Arab trend.
Ennahda objects to the stigmatizing of Islam that it claims took place historically in Tunisia. For example, President Borguiba went so far as to refer to the Islamic headscarf, the touchstone of pious Islamic observance among women in the contemporary era, as an "odious rag." 64 It also broadly embraces religious themes in its rallies and encourages public displays of religion. 65 However, Ennahda has said repeatedly and forcefully that it is not interested in Islamizing Tunisia's existing law, even the highly controversial (though Islamically derived) family laws, which are among the most progressive in the region, 66 or the rules on alcohol, 67 the consumption of which is often presented by commentators as an example of a shari'a prohibition on which there is virtually universal agreement. 68 The only way that this could possibly be consistent with a repugnancy clause would be if that clause did not relate to existing legislation.
Thus, Ennahda has expressed distaste with a past that sought to marginalize a public role for Islam and subjected individuals to discrimination for public expressions of religious piety. 69 Logically, in addition to demanding greater freedom for religious expression (a goal that can be achieved independent of repugnancy, or indeed any direct mention of Islam at all), Ennahda might then seek to prevent legal secularization measures from being enacted, and to ensure that legislation that is enacted does not violate some core notion of what [48:427 Islam is. Its repeated, stated commitment not to seek to Islamize the state, but only grant to Islam space that it had been denied, is thus perfectly consistent with an approach to repugnancy that mimics that of Egypt and Iraq. As with those two states, it is not interested in a constitutional structure or institution that will displace any existing legislation. To the extent that it is interested in some sort of Islamic control at all, therefore, it will resemble those of Egypt and Iraq, and apply exclusively prospectively.
IV. THE INCOHERENT PREFERENCES OF ISLAMIST PARTIES
Why would Islamist parties ultimately prefer a state of affairs that effectively immunizes all sorts of existing, secularized, and transplanted legislation from any sort of review for its Islamicity? Why would such parties not instead offer some sort of coherent theory setting forth what legislation must look like in order to comply with shari'a, and then demand that a body such as the judiciary apply it to all legislation, existing or prospective? Several answers might be offered to explain this rather bewildering state of affairs.
First of all, ironically, as they gain a measure of political power,
Islamist parties often find themselves in precisely the same bind in which the Egyptian SCC found itself nearly three decades earlier.
That is to say, it is nearly inconceivable that any political movement in any reasonably developed state-including Iraq, Egypt and Tunisia-could determine that money interest on a loan was somehow not riba, a practice stridently condemned in the Qur'an.
The Islamist consensus has developed deep roots, and is the basis for the practice of Islamic finance. As a result, any claim by any Islamist political movement to the contrary will immediately give rise to suspicion that the Islamist movement in question has been compromised by "Westoxification." level of plausibility. 71 Rather, it is political, in that such a reading, however plausible from a doctrinal standpoint, is simply not one the broader Muslim lay public would deem to be sufficiently Islamic.
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That Islamist movements and advocates of Islamic finance have tied the money interest prohibitions to the promotion of social justice, however ill-conceived, only makes any justificatory effort in defense of money interest harder to obtain. 73 In other words, when money interest is suggested to be a means to favor the rich and those with capital at the expense of ordinary laborers, as has often been argued, 74 then a softening of the hostility to interest is more than merely the abandonment of Divine Command in favor of Western imposed imperative, as if that were not enough. It also appears to be a capitulation to rich capitalist forces in derogation of the working classes and the poor. Hence any Islamist political figure, if asked the question directly, would almost certainly be forced to indicate that the taking of money interest on a loan was a grave sin, and repugnant to the shari'a.
Yet any Islamist figure with even a marginal understanding of political and economic realities is as aware as the SCC was in 1985 of the potentially devastating effects that a complete ban on interest would be likely to have on any national economy in the modern world. The SCC's creative dodge may not be the only one available, but having been employed in the Arab world once, it seems to have proven itself remarkably attractive. Under this approach, the judiciary will be excluded from considerations of Islamicity with respect to existing, vital legislation, and the reform of the laws to ensure their compliance with shari'a will be left in the discretion of the legislature. The legislature can ignore it in favor of higher priorities, or, should it wish to pander to conservative elements, it can defer the matter indefinitely using the standard set of tools available in any legislature's toolkit-hearings, commissions, and the production of endless reports concerning the matter.
Money interest is the most obvious example where the dichotomous approach proves appealing, but it is by no means the only one. Another example might well be the hudud, the strict 74. Id. punishments established by medieval jurists for particular violations of Divine Command. 75 These included the well-known punishment of stoning for adulterers, amputation for thieves, and death for apostates who do not repent. 76 Because the hudud were crimes against God, the punishments could not be mitigated by an exercise of judicial discretion. 77 Yet at the same time, and perhaps for the same reason, the evidentiary standards were quite strict, in some cases impossibly so. 78 This would make enforcement of the hudud perhaps rare as a realistic matter, yet nonetheless a matter of some concern for any secular Muslim or member of a minority religion who was not eager to countenance even the remote possibility of adulterers stoned or apostates killed. Even committed Muslims, those who are interested in ensuring that Islam play some role at the state, and who might otherwise be attracted to the message of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regarding economic reform and social justice, might well recoil at excesses of this sort. If measures like this were undertaken, they could damage the reputation (and electoral prospects) of the Brotherhood. However, given the long history of conservative Muslims using the Egyptian courts to force the divorces of supposed apostates with some level of success, 79 the Brotherhood could not claim to more conservative elements of their base that they 76. See id. at 5. 77. Fadel mentions the hudud as raising "particularly thorny problems" because of the obligation to enforce them once proven. Id. at 5.
78. The paradigmatic example is the prosecution for zina, or fornication, which requires four eyewitnesses to the sexual intercourse. Quraishi, supra note 15, at 179. For a more general review of the strict rules of evidence in relation to the hudud, see RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO  THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13-14 (2005). 79. Though Egypt does not prosecute the hudud, its personal-status laws do not permit the marrying of Muslims to non-Muslims, and conservative Muslim groups or individuals have successfully used these rules to order divorces as between a couple which does not desire one on the grounds that one is an apostate who has effectively renounced Islam. The most wellknown instance is that of the Egyptian intellectual Nasr Abu Zayd, whose writings on the Qur'an were deemed sufficiently heretical by some as to be a form of apostasy, a position that the Egyptian courts ultimately endorsed, thereby causing Abu Zayd to flee Egypt for Europe . The Egyptian government then took measures to institute standing requirements in proceedings of this sort, so that random people could not interpose themselves and demand a divorce that neither member of the couple nor their families sought. This was the basis upon which similar proceedings instituted against another Egyptian liberal, the writer Nawal AlSadawi, were dismissed. Id. at 738. had no interest in the hudud and were indifferent to declarations of apostasy. The SCC dodge permits them to avoid the issue.
It might also be noted that Islamist groups are not ignorant of the dominant trends in much of the world in favor of secular states, and they genuinely express concern about such trends. To the extent that the representatives of Ennahda raise Islam at all in Tunisia, it is to express broad resentment against what they view as the marginalization of Islam and persecution of the pious by the prior dictatorial regime. 80 Various members of Iraq's Constitutional Commission expressed to me the view that one of the primary purposes of the repugnancy clause was to ensure that Iraq would not develop into Turkey-so that laws that ban the headscarf, for example, as is done in Turkey in some contexts, would be struck down as void by a court or other institution whose function it was to ensure that law did not develop in a manner that was repugnant to shari'a. The concern seemed genuine, albeit paranoid. The fierce reaction of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to an Egyptian Cabinet Member's suggestion that the wearing of the headscarf was a regressive and backwards practice demonstrates the extent to which similar concerns pervade in Egypt. 81 A repugnancy clause that does not apply to existing legislation addresses this fear adequately, as it still enables the courts to strike down any potential future legislation that would be deemed hostile to Islam.
But the most important point is not so much what Islamist groups seek to evade as what they seek to advance. The casual observer might be surprised by the manner in which mainstream Islamist movements do not seem terribly concerned about Islam.
There is, for example, in the platform of the Brotherhood's current surrogate political party, requisite praise for Islam and the principles of the shari'a, articulated at such a high level of abstraction that they would not be deemed objectionable by any political movement-even a non-Muslim one. 82 Beyond this, the almost singular focus is on 82. FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PARTY, supra note 46, at Part 1 "Principles and Directions of the Party" (including as shari'a principles respect for human rights, freedom of worship, freedom of thought, respect for religious minorities, equality of all people, and reliance on democracy for political life). more standard political and economic issues. Effective and lawful state governance, development, economic reform, and social justice constitute the bulk of the platform, with Islam mentioned only briefly at the start and end. 83 Ennahda's representatives make almost no reference to Islam beyond anodyne appeals for religious freedom. 84 The almost exclusive singular focus of its candidates has been on economic issues. 85 Iraq's Shi'a Islamist political parties are not much different. While their leaders are in some (though not all) cases more obviously Islamist in orientation, 86 in that they don the traditional robes and turbans of Shi'a trained scholars, their political priorities are selfevidently focused more on issues that do not concern the shari'a. There is some level of predictable demagoguery relating to shari'aefforts to ban or restrict the sale of alcohol, 87 for example, or reform religious curricula in schools 88 -but these occupy a relatively modest proportion of attention in relation to other, more pressing concerns. Among these are negotiations over a hydrocarbon law, 89 wrangling about the future of Iraqi federalism, 90 and debates over the separation of powers. 91 Thus, Prime Minister Maliki hails from an Islamist party and has remained in power for over six years, and yet Iraqi law remains no more or less committed to shari'a than it had been in the past. 92 Even a constitutional commitment commonly understood to require the legislature to bring the Personal Status Code (governing family law and inheritance) further into conformity with shari'a has not advanced, 93 nor have any Islamist leaders shown very much interest in advancing it, at least in my conversations with them.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF ISLAMISM
The point of these reflections on the preferences of Islamist parties is not to suggest that they have embraced a robust form of secularism, for plainly they have not, nor is there any indication at all that they intend to. Family law remains firmly within the orbit of shari'a even in relatively progressive Tunisia, and there is no real suggestion that religion would cease to be taught in public schools throughout the Arab world. Yet Islamist legislative agendas in the Arab states have clearly moved beyond Islam, because of political and economic realities, and in order to mobilize a base of voters who are less concerned about state mechanisms for enforcement of aspects of shari'a and more concerned about how their lives might be improved by state activity. Hence Islamist parties offer agendas respecting employment, wages, private sector growth and anticorruption certain to be more appealing to average voters, even if such platforms are not distinctively Islamic.
Thus, in the end, as social movements, Islamist organizations obviously reflect their Islamic values and may seek to expand them, through campaigns to encourage the headscarf, competitions for young men to memorize the Qur'an, or even funding women-only public transportation. As a political and legislative agenda, however, Islam is largely (though certainly not entirely) absent, and the law of the state is largely immunized from any sort of review concerning its Islamicity. Contrary to the Muslim Brotherhood's nearly century old slogan, it seems that Islam is no longer the solution.
